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Introduction
Capital is mobile; labor is not. This is the fundamental, practical,
and operational reality of contemporary labor management rela-
tions. Multinational corporations readily can relocate their opera-
tions from, say, New York, to virtually any other point on the
globe. Workers in New York do not have nearly the same corre-
sponding mobility.
New Yorkers are at the epicenter of wrenching labor and social
transmogrifications. Dynamic technology and computerization
now facilitate the effectively instantaneous mobilization and mobil-
ity of capital, exacerbating this problem. Tremendous pools of
wealth can be amalgamated through computer technology.' Mean-
while, labor has virtually no corresponding mobility.
For most of the past century, work routinized in the industrial
model has been a defining thread of the social contract.2 This con-
1. Everyone agrees that the influences of computer technology will be profound.
There is considerable disagreement about whether computer technology will neces-
sarily be a good means to a good end or the instrument for engineering Orwellian
brave new worlds. The classic book on this topic is perhaps NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE,
THE ARCHITECTURE MACHINE (1970). See also BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD
(1995); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995); STANLEY KUBRICK,
2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (1968) (fictionalizing the popular nightmare of technological
dominance, with Hal the computer engineering the death of his human managers);
NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995); NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE
SURRENDER OF CULTURE To TECHNOLOGY (1992); KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS
AGAINST THE FUTURE: THE LUDDITES AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION-LES-
SONS FOR THE COMPUTER AGE (1995); MARK SLOUKA, WAR OF THE WORLDS:
CYBERSPACE AND THE HIGH-TECH ASSAULT ON REALITY (1995) (finding it increas-
ingly difficult to separate reality from virtual existence, warning of the uglier aspects
of seemingly unproblematic progress through computer technology, and urging reaf-
firmation of human connections to the non-computer-affected world); SHERRY TURK-
HLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1984). The popular
press is also increasingly examining the issues of computer culture. See, e.g., Michael
Krantz, The Great Manhattan Geek Rush of 1995, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 13, 1995, at 34;
The New York Cyber Sixty, N.Y. MAO., Nov. 13, 1995, at 44 (quoting Mark Stahlman,
co-founder of the New York Media Association, stating some people want to replace
the Constitution with a different form of government using this new technology, but
warning the technology and the World Wide Web will fail because people are already
getting bored with it).
2. See Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Vir-
tues, 36 B.C.L. REV. 279 (1995) (examining unions' role as mediating devices in com-
munities); Victor Davis Hanson, Labor Is What Others Do For Us, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 1996, at A21 (discussing how the devaluation of work threatens society). The norm
of socially necessary structures to enable lives beyond poverty have been developed
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ventional understanding of work is now increasingly frayed, and
perhaps obsolete. The emerging consensus is that the workplace is
often like Gertrude Stein's Oakland: there is no longer any
"there;" there is no "place" in the workplace.3
The imperative to achieve more, qualitatively and quantitatively,
with fewer human resources effecutuates the capitalist managerial
paradigm to maximize enterprise profitability. As a result, under-
employed and contingent/part-time/temporary workers-perhaps
as much as one quarter of the workforce-make up a large pool of
people, tenuously situated on the outer periphery of the economy
and usually only a few economic steps removed from the unem-
ployable and the unemployed.4
Although government employment data indicates that official
unemployment in the United States is less than five percent, every-
one recognizes that many of the details-and human beings-are
lost in the government's peculiar non-counting. For example, when
one counts the underemployed, temporary, and contingent part-
time workers who now constitute conservatively multi-millions of
workers, and those the government no longer counts, such as work-
ers who have vanished from the official unemployment figures be-
cause they have exhausted their unemployment compensation
most recently in the intellectual renaissance of the republican civic virtues movement.
See generally, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PROSPERITY (1995) (noting that the liberal political and economic institutions
depend on healthy and dynamic civil society for their vitality); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (arguing that equal citizenship requires freedom
from desperate economic misery); Robert Kuttner, Needed: A Two Way Social Con-
tract in the Workplace, Bus. WK., July 10, 1995, at 22 ("The elements of a decent, two-
way social contract in the workplace require floors set by either national policies or
strong labor unions."). This has long been a cornerstone of Catholic social teaching.
See John Langan, The Contract With American And Catholic Social Teaching,
AMERICA, July 29, 1995, at 10. For a related work on the necessity of meaningful
employment in the social contract, see Richard J. Armeson, Is Work Special? Justice
and the Distribution of Employment, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1127 (1990).
3. Even those workers who teleconference and telecommute routinely in cyber-
space ultimately must have some physical site for their work; workers are not nearly
as ephemeral, indeed metaphysical, as is capital.
4. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, Temporary Employment and the Imbal-
ance of Power, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1647 (1996); Symposium, New Approaches to Pov-
erty Law, Teaching, and Practice: Changing Economy, Changing Lives:
Unemployment Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291
(1995); Symposium, The Regulatory Future of Contingent Employment, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 725 (1995); Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Econ-
omy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557 (1996).
Many part-time and temporary workers are involuntary unemployed. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR AND COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 21 (May 1994).
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insurance benefits after twenty-six weeks, the "official" unemploy-
ment level may be only one-third of actual unemployment. In
most metropolitan population centers, and especially among racial
minority populations, there has been no effective and meaningful
work for generations. At the same time, the national economy in
1997-and the job market-is reputedly stronger than in all but a
few years of the post World War II half-century.6
The front page of the Wall Street Journal on May 28, 1996 re-
ported that nearly one quarter of all recent college graduates are
willing to work temporarily for "free." They do so, in desperate
efforts, to persuade employers by their diligence, competence, and
hard work that they are worthy of consideration for subsequent
(compensated) employment.7 This is a deeply troubling and very
accurate barometer of the pervasive anxiety felt throughout the
world of work. Likewise, there is an increasing number of anec-
dotes about displaced mid-career white collar managers and execu-
tives-terminated by the multi-millions throughout the past
decade-and-a-half era of constant "down sizing"-who are also
willing to work for "free."8 These realities, perhaps more than any
other vignette, highlight the issues surrounding the exploitation of
"free labor."
Welfare reform legislation, via the federal Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, now man-
dates that the adult welfare population find work, despite the
structural absence of meaningful work opportunities for the un-
skilled and poorly educated in most environments. 9 Most state
5. In October 1997, the national unemployment rate was reported as 4.7%, down
from 4.9% in September. Kirk Johnson, Unemployment Dips and Jobs Rise in City,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at B6 [hereinafter Johnson I]. For that same period, the
New York State unemployment rate remained steady at 6.4%. Id. Although higher
than the state's rates, New York City's unemployment fell during that time to 9.1%
from 9.3% in September. Id. New York City added over 53,000 new jobs during the
first ten months of 1997, the City's best job-creation performance since 1984. Id.
6. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996); see also Steve
Rhodes & Karen Springer, Yup: Help Wanted, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1997, at 52 (re-
porting 17.7% unemployment in inner-city Milwaukee, with major labor shortages in
technology sectors in many metropolitan population centers).
7. See Paulette Thomas, A Special News Report about Life on the Job and Trends
Taking Shape There, WALL ST. J. May 28, 1996, at Al.
8. See id.
9. "In 1996, there were seven million unemployed workers.... [A]t the
same time, more than four million other workers wanted full-time work but
were able to find only part-time jobs; thirteen million additional workers had
year round, full-time jobs that paid less than the poverty level; and a million
other people were so discouraged that they had stopped looking for jobs
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governments, however, do not have enough resources to fund
meaningful work programs on a significant scale. As a result, gov-
ernments are placing an increasing number of welfare recipients in
once protected public sector jobs.' 0
This Article examines the deep human rights concerns within the
transmogrifying world of work, focusing on the integral part that
altogether. So, twenty-five milion people-nineteen percent of the
workforce-were out of work or underemployed."
John E. Schwartz, Mother Teresa's Economics Lesson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at
B14.
The national unemployment rate in August and September 1997 was 4.9%. See
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Job Growth Was Modest Last Month, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1997, at D1. In September, the manufacturing industry lost 16,000 jobs, mainly re-
flecting the temporary closing of several automobile plants for inventory adjustment
and a sizable job loss in the apparel industry although factories had created 48,000
jobs in August. See id. In addition, 12.9% of the unemployed population quit their
last jobs. See id. Moreover, "hidden unemployment," consisting of 3.9 million people
working part-time because full-time work was unavailable and 300,000 discouraged
workers no longer looking for work, grew. See id.
Despite these statistics, in a Presidential statement following the October 3, 1997
release of the most recent economic data, President Clinton said: "Real wages are
rising, the American economy has created 13.2 million new jobs since the begining of
my administration, and for the first time in twenty-four years, the unemployment rate
has remained at or below five percent for six consecutive months." Daniel J. Roy, Job
Growth Slows in September; Unemployment Remains at 4.9 Percent, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 193, at D-26 (Oct. 6, 1997).
Although the national unemployment rate in October 1997 was 4.7%, the unem-
ployment rate for New York State was 6.4%. See Johnson I, supra note 5, at B6. At
the same time, New York City's unemployment rate of 9.1% nearly doubled the na-
tional rate. See id. Nevertheless, according to Joseph Lhota, the City's director of the
Office of Management and Budget, New York City is experiencing its largest increase
in jobs in the last thirteen years. See New York City Employment Growth Strongest in
13 Years, CAP. MKT. REP., Sept. 23, 1997. A long-term trend in New York City re-
mained unchanged as more jobs in high-skilled industries, such as business services,
financial services, and tourism, were created. See Kirk Johnson, Steady Jobless Rates,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at B6. Furthermore, the publishing industry added about
10,000 jobs in the City last year. See id.
According to a report by Alan G. Hevesi, the New York City Comptroller, the
types of jobs which are being created are mainly on Wall Street, at high-technology
companies and firms that require advanced skill and education. See Thomas J. Lueck,
Job Boom in New York City Excludes City Residence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at
B6. The City produced 21,900 new jobs in the first half of the year but recorded a
drop of 23,900 in the number of working residents. See Rose Kim, City Jobs Going to
Surburbanites, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1997, at A32. This type of growth has created a
wealth of opportunity, but not for people living in New York City. Skilled suburban-
ites have been displacing lesser-skilled City residents and reaping the benefits of the
increased number of jobs. See Lueck, supra, at B6. This mismatch between location
and skill level of new jobs reveals the true nature behind the healthy economy for
low-skilled workers.
10. See E.S. Savas, Welfare Reformers vs. Public-Sector Unions, WALL ST. J., Nov.
21, 1996, at A22.
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work plays in the definition, construction, maintenance, and en-
hancement of the social contract in the context of the New York
City welfare workforce.
Part I reviews the "employee"/partner/independent contractor
distinctions, focusing on recent case law, the regulatory tax regime,
and related issues.11 Part II examines the complex pressures that
workfare legislation will exert throughout most sectors of the
workforce and the unemployed. Part III explores the role of Cath-
olic social teachings on workers' rights as well as the reemergence
of the "living wage" initiative. This Article concludes that the situ-
ation is grim, perhaps inexorably Malthusian. As huge pools of
surplus labor bid unsuccessfully for increasingly scarce jobs, all but
the most educated and technologically adept face unrelenting
11. For an excellent overview of case law and various statutory and treatise crite-
ria regarding employer-employee and independent contractor relationships, see Rich-
ard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of
Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661 (1996). See also John P. Hiatt &
Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the Twenty-first Century, 12 LAB. LAW.
165 (1996); Lewis L. Malthy & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The
Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Include Independent
Contractors, 38 B.C.L. REV. 239 (1997); Claudia MacLachlan, IRS Struggles To Define
Independent Contractor, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B1. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board is currently reconsidering the common law right-of-control test to deter-
mine whether a worker is an independent contractor. See Labor and Management
Revisit NLRB Test For Independent Contractors, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at
D-16 (Dec. 9, 1996).
Recently, both the Second and Sixth Circuits found that even partners dismissed by
major firms are "employees" for Title VII employment discrimination law purposes.
See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Johnson &
Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2nd Cir. 1996). But see Devine v. Stone Leyton &
Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a paralegal fired by law firm
could not successfully argue that all attorneys were employees of the firm for Title
VII purposes); Chris Klein, Partner May Be Judged 'Employee', NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23,
1996, at B1. In EEOC v. Fawn Vendors, Inc., 965 F.Supp. 909 (S.D. Tex. 1996), the
court held that the employer had the right to control the details and manner of the
salesperson's work performance. Id. at 912. The worker was deemed to be an em-
ployee and not an independent contractor even though the salesperson had signed a
document describing her as an independent agent, was paid on a commission-only
basis, and did not have taxes withheld from paychecks. Id. at 913. Because the
worker was an employee and not an independent contractor, her Title VII lawsuit for
unlawful employment discrimination could proceed against the employer. Id. Of
course, the double edge of the sword is that the injured independent contractor
worker, unlike the statutory employee, may sue in tort, whereas the injured employee
is usually limited to recovery pursuant to the workers' compensation statute. In addi-
tion, temporary workers are often regarded as independent contractors-"contract"
workers-who work for the temporary service agency provider. Thus, the temporary
service agency provider is regarded as the employer and is subject to the employer
provisions of the workers' compensation statute. See, e.g., Goodman v. Sioux Steel
Co., 475 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1991).
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downward pressures on wage compensation. These dynamics sur-
rounding the welfare workforce shape the perception, and reality,
of public and private sector employers towards workers well into
the next century.' 2
I. The Work Relationship: "Employee" or... ?
Many approaches have been used to frame the working relation-
ship, and to determine whether a worker is an "employee," an "in-
dependent contractor," a "partner," or something else. Labor and
employment law generally presume that the worker is in an em-
ployee-employer relationship. 3 The prevailing statutory and case
law regime is very skeptical of those employers who seek to disa-
vow the conventional employer-employee relationship, attempting
instead to categorize their workers as "independent contractors" or
"partners. "14
The classification of a worker can have important tax conse-
quences for both parties. An employer must withhold federal and
state income tax from an employee's wages,15 pay federal and state
payroll taxes,'6 withhold FICA tax from wages,' 7 and report the
employee's wages to the IRS and to the employee.' 8 Some em-
ployers are, therefore, seduced by the supposed immediate benefit
resulting from a recharacterization of workers as "independent
contractors." If the worker is an independent contractor, the em-
ployer does not have these extensive statutory obligations. The
employer must submit an IRS Form 1099 for each worker to whom
it pays more than $600 per year, while the worker is responsible for
12. This Article is part of an ongoing and larger project regarding the enhance-
ment of human dignity in the arena of work. See David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor
Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1987); David
L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 57 (1996); David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental
Human and Civil Right, 9 Miss. C.L. REv. 135 (1988).
13. For example, the federal minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
defines "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e)(1) (1993). The United States Supreme Court has said "a broader or more
comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be difficult to frame." United
States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945).
14. See Carlson, supra note 11, at 664-87.
15. I.R.C. § 3401 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
16. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 1989 & Supp.
1995).
17. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 1989 & Supp.
1995).
18. See Rita A. McConnell, Defining the Employment Relationship, in EMPLOY-
MENT LAW & PRAc. 47, 54 (Stephen F. Befort & Karen G. Schanfield eds., 1995).
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declaring federal and state taxes on amounts received from the em-
ployer, and for federal self-employment tax. 19
The Internal Revenue Service is aware that many employers may
be tempted to disavow the employer-employee relationship and
recharacterize their workers as independent contractors. Because
the federal government relies on the traditional employer-em-
ployee relationship to maximize its tax receipts this knowledge has
led the federal government to renew its efforts to reassert and
strengthen the employer-employee relationship.2 ° Therefore, an
employer who misclassifies employees as independent contractors
may be liable for past-due taxes, including interest and penalties.2'
A. The Common Law Test
Under common law, the master-servant relationship is the tradi-
tional agency law criterion often used as a starting point in deter-
mining if a worker is an employee or independent contractor. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency test is:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the
affairs of another and who with respect to the physical con-
duct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant
or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a dis-
tinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of
the employer or by a specialist without supervision.
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the worker supplies the instru-
mentality's tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
19. See id. at 54-55.
20. See id.; see also Leah Beth Ward, Tax Rules Squeezing Independent Contrac-
tors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at sec. 3, p.9 ("The law at issue is Section 1706 of the
Internal Revenue Code.... It requires companies to apply a 20-point test in distin-
guishing between employees and independent contractors.").
21. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3401 (1997).
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(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business
of the employer;
(i) whether the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant;
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.22
This test is case specific, focusing on the relationship between the
parties and the work performed.
B. Case Precedents
The application of the common law test has become a widely
litigated issue.
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,23 the United
States Supreme Court used the common law test to determine
whether a worker was an "employee." From the amalgam of vari-
ables set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court
determined the salient factor to be the extent of supervisory "con-
trol" over the worker and the work: the greater the degree of "con-
trol," the more likely the worker is an employee rather than an
independent contractor. 24
Reid arose after the trustee of an advocacy organization for the
homeless entered into an oral agreement with Reid to create a
sculpture. Once the sculpture, "Third World America," was com-
pleted, the parties disagreed about who owned the copyright.
Under the Copyright Act of 197625 ("Act"), the person who "trans-
lates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression" is entitled to copy-
right protection.26 Nonetheless, unless there is a written agreement
to the contrary, the employer retains ownership when the work is
made for hire.
The Court in Reid determined that the Act provided two ave-
nues for works to acquire "work for hire" status, one for employ-
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
23. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). For commentary, see Elizabeth Flagg, Insurance Agents
Slip Through the "Good Hands" of ERISA: "Employee" Defined by Agency Princi-
ples in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1099, 1110 (1993).
24. The holistic "economic realities" of the worker's dependence on supervision in
order to perform work is a symmetrically related and important test for the employer-
employee relationship. See Carlson, supra note 11, at 667-71.
25. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541-98.
26. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737.
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ees and another for independent contractors.27 Because the Act
did not define the term "employee," the Court concluded that
Congress intended to maintain the master-servant relationship of
the common law agency doctrine.28 Applying these factors, the
Court concluded that Reid was an independent contractor, not an
employee. 29 As such, he retained the rights to the sculpture.
2. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court again wrestled with
the definition of "employee" in Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company v. Darden.3° Darden, an insurance salesman, contracted
to sell only Nationwide policies. Nationwide enrolled Darden in its
retirement plan upon the condition that he would forfeit his enti-
tlement to pension benefits if, within a year of his termination, he
sold competitors' policies within twenty-five miles of his prior busi-
ness location. After eighteen years of service, Darden was termi-
nated. Darden then sold competitors' policies from the same
location. Nationwide charged that Darden's new business activities
disqualified him from receiving any pension benefits. Darden
sued, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 197431 ("ERISA"). The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Nationwide, finding that Darden was not a proper ERISA
plaintiff because he was an independent contractor and not an
"employee."32 ERISA tautologically defines "employee" as "any
individual employed by an employer. 33
The court of appeals vacated and remanded.34 It determined
that while Darden probably would not qualify as an employee
under traditional tests, the traditional definition was inconsistent
with the declared policies and purposes of ERISA The court
held that an ERISA plaintiff can qualify as an employee by show-
ing a reasonable expectation that he would receive benefits, reli-
ance on this reasonable expectation, and the lack of the economic
bargaining power to contract out of the benefit plan forfeiture pro-
27. Id. at 731.
28. Id. at 740.
29. Id. at 752.
30. 503 U.S. 318 (1992); see also Flagg, supra note 23, at 1110.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
32. Darden, 503 U.S. at 320.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1993).
34. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 709 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
35. Id. at 705.
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vision. 36 The court of appeals reasoned that the term "employee"
should be interpreted "in light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained, ' 37 and remanded the case. Under the new
test, the district court found Darden to be an "employee. '38
Citing Reid, the Supreme Court reversed.39 The Court explained
that ERISA's definition of "employee" was pointless and tautolog-
ical.40 The Court adopted the common law definition, as it did in
Reid, stating that the court of appeals relied on the "feeble prece-
dents" of supposed "economic realities" in departing from com-
mon law agency principles.4 The Court applied the Restatement of
Agency section 220 and common law criteria, not the "economic
realities" test, to determine whether the worker was an employee:
[We] consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other
factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source
of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when
and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party
is in business; the provision of employee, benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.42
3. Simpson v. Ernst & Young
During the past term, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari to Simpson v. Ernst & Young.43 Thus, the court of ap-
peals' decision holding many "partners" at a major accounting firm
were "employees" rather than true partners-owners, for employ-
ment discrimination law purposes, remains the law. It is uncertain
whether Ernst & Young signals that the Court is prepared to clarify
further, or to reexamine significantly, the factors and the concepts
36. Id. at 706.
37. Id.
38. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 388, 393 (E.D.N.C. 1989),
rev'd, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
39. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322.
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id. at 324-25.
42. Id. at 323-24.
43. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
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of the employment relationship it has thus far articulated in its
Reid and Darden decisions.
In Ernst & Young, the plaintiff filed suit seeking damages pursu-
ant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act44 ("ADEA"),
which protects against age discrimination, and under ERISA45
claiming the employer terminated him in order to deny retirement
plan benefits. The court addressed the distinction between part-
ners and employees, using a range of common law principles:
The right and duty to participate in management; the right and
duty to act as an agent of other partners; exposure to liability;
the fiduciary relationship among partners; use of the term "co-
owners" to indicate each partner's "power of ultimate control;"
participation in profits and losses; investment in the firm; partial
ownership of firm assets; voting rights; the aggrieved individ-
ual's ability to control and operate the business; the extent to
which the aggrieved individual's compensation was calculated as
a percentage of the firm's profits; the extent of that individual's
employment security; and other similar indicia of ownership.46
Although the decision may be viewed as an application of the
economic realities test, which has been questioned, the court ex-
plained that both the economic realities test and the common law
test involve the employer's ability to control job performance and
employment opportunities of the aggrieved individual.47 In Ernst
& Young, the court found that the plaintiff had no bona fide own-
ership interest, no fiduciary relationship, no share in the profits, no
management control, no right to vote on decisions, and no job se-
curity. He was, therefore, not a partner but simply an employee
limited to his position and under the control of those performing
the managerial duties above.
On January 24, 1997, the United States Supreme Court denied
hearing the case of Simpson v. Ernst & Young.48 Without any clari-
fication from the Supreme Court, the circuits remain divided in in-
terpreting the term "employee." For example, the Tenth Circuit
analyzed the "total bundle of partnership characteristics" to deter-
mine if one is a partner or an employee, 49 while the Eleventh Cir-
cuit focused on the "actual role played by the claimant in the
operations of the involved entity and the extent to which that role
44. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
46. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d at 443-44.
47. Id. at 442.
48. Id. at 436.
49. Id. at 443.
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dealt with traditional concepts of management, control and
ownership. 50
II. The Welfare Workforce
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation ACt5'
("1996 Act"). Among its most significant features, the federal enti-
tlements to welfare 52 and the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children 53 ("AFDC") programs have been abolished. They were
replaced by the 16.3 billion dollar Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families 4 state block grants program. Welfare recipients can re-
ceive benefits for a maximum of five years.55 Once the time limit
expires, participants will lose all benefits.5 6 Only about twenty per-
cent of those on public welfare, those who are the least employ-
able, may remain on welfare beyond the five year maximum limit.5 7
By legislative mandate, the New Deal welfare ethos is gone. The
welfare poor 58 must now work to maintain benefits for a finite pe-
riod, placing tremendous downward wage and job security pres-
sures on public sector workers.
The new law also prohibits able-bodied, childless adults between
the ages of eighteen and fifty from collecting food stamps for more
than three months in any three year period unless they work at
least twenty hours a week.5 9 There is no exemption for recipients
who cannot find work. 60 The new law severely penalizes welfare
recipients who shrink from their work obligation. If parents with
50. Id.
51. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. For a summary of the litigation quickly filed to
challenge the new law on constitutional and other grounds, see Richmond C. Reuben,
The Welfare Challenge: States Face Tough Choices and Lawsuits under New Act, 83
A.B.A. J. 34 (Jan. 1997).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1996).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-618 (1996).
54. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103 (new
§ 402(a) of the Social Security Act).
55. Id. § 408(a)(7).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 408(a)(7)(c)(11).
58. Welfare recipients range from self-confident, college-educated, divorced
mothers to high school dropouts addicted to drugs as well as those who fall some-
where in between. See John Harwood, The Bumpy Road From Welfare to Work,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 1997, at B1.
59. 18 Soc. SERV. § 387.1 (1996).
60. Id.; see also Editorial, Food Stamps for the Unemployed, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 26,
1996, at A26.
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minor dependent children do not work pursuant to the federal
mandate, the family will not receive the parents' share of the fam-
ily's monthly welfare check for one month; for the second offense,
the entire family loses its check for one month.61
A. New York City Workfare
New York City has instituted the largest public jobs program
since the Great Depression in order to comply with the 1996 fed-
eral welfare reform legislation.62  The program may create a
workforce of hundreds of thousands of former welfare recipients at
a cost exceeding one billion dollars a year.63 New York City has
the largest state-sponsored work program ("workfare") in the
country with 35,000 out of 450,000 welfare adults already working
for their welfare benefits. More than 100,000 participants likely
will enter the workforce within a few years, at a rate of 4,000 to
5,000 persons per month.64
Workfare started in New York City as the Work Experience Pro-
gram65 ("WEP"). Under this program, able-bodied single people
without children who receive money under the state's Home Relief
("HR") Program must work twenty-six hours each week.66 New
York City assigns them jobs ranging from picking up litter to clean-
ing up the Staten Island Ferry.67 A number of workfare partici-
pants clean the City's parks as part of the Park Career Training
Program68 ("Pact").69 Training and the seductive, but probably not
realizable, promise of a permanent job are also part of this pro-
gram. For example, an individual working thirty-five hours a week
for Pact receives $352 per month in HR benefits, plus $112 per
month in food stamps and Medicaid.7"
61. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
§ 407(e)(1). Benefits are lost for two months on the third offense and for six months
on the fourth offense. Id.
62. See David Firestone, New York Girding for Surge in Workfare Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Firestone I].
63. See Workfare's Missing Link, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at A16.
64. See Lizette Alvarez, Giuliani and Union Praise Successes of Workfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at sec. 1, p.5 1 .
65. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385 (1996).
66. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385.13 (1995).
67. See Karen W. Arenson, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment to Fall, CUNY says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, at Al.
68. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385 (1996).
69. See Douglas Martin, Making It Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1996, at sec. 13, p. 3.
70. See id.
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Currently 4,500 workers are employed by the New York City
Parks Department program; 500 are in Pact.71 There have been
undeniable objective improvements credited to the work of these
supplemental workers.72 For example, approximately ninety per-
cent of the New York City parks were considered clean in 1996, up
from seventy-six percent in 1995. 71 In addition, the City govern-
ment asserts that the most important objective-moving persons
from welfare dependency into productive employment-is gradu-
ally beginning to be achieved.74 Approximately 110,000 people
have completed the New York City workfare program.'" Acording
to one of Mayor Guiliani's senior advisors, the City had 235,000
fewer persons on welfare in February 1997 than in March 1995.76
In April 1996, New York City began requiring those who receive
AFDC benefits to work at least twenty hours a week or lose public
assistance for their children. 77 These new workers, given no bene-
fits other than Medicaid, effectively earn less than the federal mini-
mum wage.78 Many program participants receive as little as $68.50
in cash and $60 in food stamps every two weeks.79 If adhering to a
work requirement of twenty-six hours per week, that breaks down
to approximately $.80 to $1.50 per hour, in addition to their welfare
benefits. 8° Moreover, the work requirement is slated to increase
steadily, mandating participants work thirty hours a week by the
year 2000.81The workfare program now costs New York City between $1,200
and $3,000 a year per workfare worker, with some City officials
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Steven Greenhouse, City Labor Director Backs Effort to Organized
Workfare Participants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at sec. 1, p.39 [hereinafter Green-
house I]; Alvarez, supra note 64, at sec. 1, p.51 (remarking that there were 210,000
fewer New Yorkers on welfare in December 1996 than at its creation two years
earlier).
77. See Greenhouse I, supra note 76, at sec. 1, p.39; Alvarez, supra note 64, at sec.
1, p.51. Travel money for students and child care support has been limited to two
years, shortening the previous level of three years. See Greenhouse I, supra note 76,
at sec. 1, p.3 9.
78. See Firestone I, supra note 62, at Al.
79. See Greenhouse I, supra note 76, at sec. 1, p.3 9.
80. See Greenhouse I, supra note 76, at sec. 1, p.39; Glenn Burkins, Unions Aim to
Recruit Workers Entering the Job Market Because of Welfare Overhaul, WALL. ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 1997, at A20.
81. See Firestone I, supra note 62, at Al.
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estimating that the per capita cost already is closer to $3,500.82
These figures include the cost of supervising the workfare workers
and the administrative monitoring of the program, but do not in-
clude child care, about $6,500 per child.83 The total cost to New
York City might reach $400 million a year, well beyond the amount
the federal government provides.14 New York State will be ex-
pected to pay an estimated $1.3 billion for job-related programs
over the next five years.8 5 Each state must meet certain federal
targets or lose substantial amounts of federal aid: twenty-five per-
cent of adult welfare recipients must work twenty hours per week
by the end of 1997 for the state to receive its full share of federal
money under the new federal law; and fifty percent of welfare re-
cipients must be in a workfare program by the year 2002.86
According to Governor Pataki, if states are required to adhere to
a federal minimum wage standard, the program will become too
costly. 7 In addition, the Governor plans to scale back welfare ben-
efits by forty-five percent over the next five years.8 8 He wants to
use $354 million of the $730 million available for welfare for other
purposes. 89 For example, he suggests giving vouchers for food and
clothes, rather than cash assistance, and proposes that the counties
create job slots.a0 If the state does not provide enough money to
the counties, however, any proposed voucher system will fail, and
the counties will be unable to create a sufficient number of jobs.9'
Moreover, the new workfare rules may be causing thousands of
students to drop out of college, thus grossly frustrating the search
for economic opportunity offered by higher education.92 Mayor
Giuliani advocates putting welfare recipients to work, even at the
expense of education, because working will restore a sense of dig-
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Joel M. Poch, Workfare: An Analysis of a Doomed Elixir, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J.
42 (April 1997).
86. See Rochelie Sharpe, Work Week, Welfare to Work: A Special News Report
About Life on the Job-and Trends Taking Shape There, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1997, at
Al.
87. See Rachel L. Swarns, Pataki Assails White House on Workfare, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1997, at sec. 1, p.2 1.
88. See id.
89. See Editorial, Funds for the Workfare Transition, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1997, at
A22.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Arenson, supra note 67, at Al.
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nity to those receiving public assistance. 93 In today's global, post-
industrial economy, however, an education may be the best way
out of a life of dead-end jobs and welfare dependency. 94 The
number of students on welfare atending the City University of New
York has dropped from 27,000 to 22,000. 95 Some experts argue
that while some students may be dropping out because of rising
tuition and decreasing financial aid, the large majority have left be-
cause of the welfare restrictions.96 This type of employment pro-
vides only a short-term escape from welfare.97
Justice Solomon of the New York State Supreme Court recently
ruled that the City must stop assigning welfare recipients to
workfare programs unless it first fully assesses their needs and
skills to determine whether they should attend school instead.9 s By
steering welfare recipients away from education, the system is un-
dermining their job prospects and possibilities for economic ad-
vancement.99 Justice Solomon also ruled that participation in
workfare may not unreasonably interfere with education. 100
In another 1996 case, Justice Helen Freedman ordered the City
to stop evaluating newly homeless parents for its workfare pro-
gram. 101 In the New York City workfare program, homeless adults
living with their children in City shelters must work for the City in
exchange for their welfare benefits. 0 2 Justice Freedman held that
93. See David Firestone, Praising the Wonders of Workfare, Giuliani Finds a Cam-
paign Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Firestone II].
94. See id. A workfare position sweeping streets is not the same as a street-
sweeper helping to pass the civil servant test. The welfare position is technically not a
job, it is not secure, and does not offer any potential for advancement. The Sanitation
Department has not hired any workfare participants because 15,000 are currently on
the waiting list. See id.
95. See Arenson, supra note 67, at Al.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Steven Greenhouse, Judge Orders Assessments for Workfare Recipients,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Greenhouse II].
99. See id. For example, a woman receiving welfare, who had to take a clinical
internship to graduate as a respiratory therapist, was told she would lose almost one-
third of her benefits if she did not work twenty hours per week, which she claimed
would prevent her from completing her internship in time to take that fall's licensing
exam. See Steven Greenhouse, Judge Eases Workfare Rules for Recipients Taking
Classes, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at B8 [hereinafter Greenhouse III].
100. See Greenhouse II, supra note 98, at B3.
101. See Randy Kennedy, Workfare Screening of Homeless Starts, Then Stops, N.Y.
Trams, Aug. 21, 1996, at Bi; see also Matthew Goldstein, Ban Continued on City Pol-
icy for Homelessness; Interviews for Workfare Blocked at Bronx Office, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 30, 1996, at 1.
102. See David Firestone, Homeless Parents in New York Face a Work Mandate,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Firestone III].
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the City could conduct interviews in City centers where families
temporarily live before going into shelters, but could not force resi-
dents to work until they had moved into apartment-like city shel-
ters. 10 3 Advocates for the poor argued that New York City
deliberately is using workfare to deter homeless families from
seeking welfare and housing.1°4 The City administration contended
that extending the workfare program to the homeless is a natural
outgrowth of the program.10 5 Justice Freedman found that this
workfare requirement further disrupts the already disordered lives
of homeless people, taking children away from parents who must
report to jobs at a time when they cannot find shelter. 06
While the workfare program may be an ambitious project, prob-
ably only a small number of participants are going to find viable
permanent jobs.'0 7 New York City's economy is growing too
slowly to absorb hundreds of thousands of poorly educated, un-
skilled people. 0 8 In addition, a mismatch exists between the sec-
tors of the economy that are growing-business services, media,
and the computer and data services industry-and the largely
poorly educated and unskilled welfare recipients who will be thrust
futilely into the private sector job market.10 9
Most welfare recipients are capable of performing low-skill, en-
try-level jobs. Even in cities where unemployment rates are low,
the jobless rate for those seeking entry-level jobs may be twice that
of other workers. 110 For example, one study found that anywhere
from four to nine workers are in search of entry-level jobs for
every entry-level job opening."' There is also a geographic gulf
between urban centers, where welfare recipients are concentrated,
103. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at B1.
104. See David Firestone, Debating Workfare: Mayor's Effort Raises Questions
Over Impact on Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1996, at B4 [hereinafter Firestone IV].
105. See id.
106. See id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 101, at Bi.
107. For example, the Work First New Jersey welfare law has resulted in commit-
ments to provide 8000 jobs with private businesses. See Ronald Smothers, Kmart
Agrees to Hire 400 Ex-Welfare Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1997, at A21. Kmart,
which operates 47 stores and employs 6400, has agreed to hire 400 welfare recipients.
To promote these partnerships a Job Link system has been suggested to put welfare
recipients in contact with the private sector. Id.
108. See Alan Finder, Welfare Clients Outnumber Jobs They Might Fill, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1996, at Al.
109. See WILSON, supra note 6.
110., See Bob Herbert, In America: The Artful Dodger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997,
at A15.
111. See id.
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and suburban areas, where higher-wage jobs are often located.112
Companies, therefore, need local county welfare agencies to help
find job applicants, aid new workers with child care,. provide em-
ployment counseling, and help transport employees to their jobs.'13
It is estimated that only thirty percent of welfare recipients can
make the transition to private sector positions with minimal sup-
port, while another forty percent could only be hired after exten-
sive pre-employment counseling and training." 4  Over thirty
percent of welfare recipients, however, will never be able to work
because of criminal records, drug addiction, or psychological
problems. 115
New York City holds 3.3 million jobs, although more than thir-
teen percent of its population is on welfare. Since the recession of
1990-1991, there has been a net gain of 90,000 jobs." 6 Over the last
three years, employment in the private sector has grown by an av-
erage of 1.5% annually. 1 7 In 1996, 44,500 jobs were added to the
private sector in New York City;" 8 53,000 additional jobs were cre-
ated in the first ten months of 1997.119 At this rate of growth, if
every job gained in the City's economy went to a person on wel-
fare, it would take well into the next century for the economy to
absorb all of the 470,000 adults on welfare in New York City.
120
112. See William J. Holstein & Warren Cohen, Ready, Aim, Hire, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 31, 1997, at 48; Frederick Rose, Prospects Dim for Workfare, a
Study Shows, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at 9A (noting that Nevada is expected to
provide more than three times the number of jobs needed to put welfare recipients to
work whereas New York, a welfare-heavy state, is projected to create just thirteen
percent of the jobs needed).
113. See Holstein & Cohen, supra note 112, at 48.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Clifford J. Levy, Wall St. Profits Lead a Recovery in New York City, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at Al ("From January to August [1996], 32,000 new jobs were
generated in the city .... [During] the same period [in 1995,] only 9,000 were
created.").
117. See Randy M. Mastro, New York's Job Market is Alive and Well, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1997, at A23.
118. See Kirk Johnson, New York Created 44,500 Jobs in 1996, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1997, at B8.
119. See Eric Johnson, U.S. Says New York Outdid Suburbs in '96 Job Growth, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1997, at B8; Johnson I, supra note 5, at B6.
120. Approximately 1.5 million jobs were lost during the 1990-91 recession, includ-
ing one million jobs from the manufacturing and construction sectors. See Christo-
pher J. Singleton, Industry Employment and the 1990-1991 Recession, MONTHLY LAB.
REv. 15 (July 1993). The losses were especially severe in New York City. See Kirk
Johnson, Evolution of the Workplace Alters Office Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1994, at B1. During this recession, the manufacturing industry lost twenty percent of
their jobs; finance, insurance, and real estate lost fourteen percent of their positions;
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New York State is expected to generate less than half the
number of low skilled positions necessary to absorb the welfare
recipients expected to need work in the next two years. 121 Also,
271,000 New York City residents are unemployed and looking for
work, but not on welfare. 122 About fifteen percent of the jobs in
New York City are part-time, and another twenty percent are held
by persons who reside in the suburbs. 23 The remaining jobs usu-
ally require far more education and skill than the average welfare
recipient possesses, while jobs requiring less skill have markedly
declined throughout the economy. 24 The Employment Policies In-
stitute, an industries-funded center in Washington, D.C., estimates
that "38% of the welfare population is functionally illiterate, un-
able to fill out a simple job application.' ' 25
Workfare has not been successful thus far in helping any signifi-
cant number of people in New York City find full-time jobs. 126
Fewer than one-tenth of the 125,000 people who have passed
through the New York City program have reported finding perma-
nent jobs.127 Almost two-thirds have dropped out of the program
and given up their benefits without indicating they have done so
because they found a permanent job. 28 City officials argue that
those who have left the program probably have obtained and main-
tained employment because the homeless rate has not appreciably
increased.1 29
and wholesale and retail trade suffered a twenty-eight percent job loss. See Samuel
M. Ehrenhalt, Economic and Demographic Change: The Case of New York City,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 40, 41 (Feb. 1993). In the first half of 1996, "270,513 layoffs
were announced.... 28% higher than the same period [in 1995]." Beth Belton, Work-
ers' Situation Seems to Be Improving, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1996, at 5B. The current
trend shows an increase in the number of jobs being created in some parts of the
country. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Labor Market Tightens but Pay Gains Stay Slim:
Concerns Persist About Wage Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at D1. These re-
placement jobs are mostly in the service sector and are accompanied by lower wages.
See Sara Rimer, The Fraying of Community, in THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE DOWN-
SIZING OF AMERICA 111, 114 (1996).
121. See Rose, supra note 112, at 9A.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. The New York State Department of Labor reports that seventy-five percent of
the new entry level employees in New York City require training and education be-
yond a high school diploma for entry level jobs. See id. Meanwhile, fifty-five percent
of adult welfare recipients have not completed high school. See id.
125. See Burkins, supra note 80, at A20.
126. See David Firestone, Workfare Cuts Costs but Tracking New Jobs Poses
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at B1 [hereinafter Firestone V].
127. See Firestone II, supra note 93, at B3.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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According to Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
a national nonprofit group that evaluates welfare experiments, wel-
fare programs that offer useful vocational training have the great-
est success in getting welfare recipients to better jobs.130 New York
City has about 1,500 people in small pilot training programs, learn-
ing skills like plumbing, carpentry, and specialized cleaning.13 1
Furthermore, some of the private companies that have hired for-
mer workfare participants report that only a few workers keep
their "permanent jobs" more than a few months. 32
Since the beginning of the welfare changes in New York City in
1994,33 166,000 people have left the welfare rolls, and another
27,000 forfeited welfare benefits when told they had to spend
twenty-six hours per week in the workfare program. 134 Workfare
has reduced the city's welfare rolls by 240,000 people in the last
year. 135 Nationwide, there were 4,388,380 persons on welfare when
the new federal legislation was signed into law in August 1996, a
7.1% decline since July 1995.136 Between March 1994 and October
1996, every state, except Hawaii, experienced at least a five percent
decline in the number of welfare recipients. 137 Evidence indicates
that the rates of decline are accelerating. 13 In October 1997, the
national employment rate declined to 4.7%, the lowest rate since
1973,'139 due, in some part, to some welfare recipients beginning to
work.
B. Workfare Recipients Are Not Employees
The question whether a worker is an employee or an independ-
ent contractor applies to the welfare workforce as well. The salient
issue is whether the welfare workers are "employees" protected by
federal and state labor and employment laws. These core rights
include the protection of the welfare workers' right to unionize and
130. See id. While there are 35,000 people in the New York City workfare program,
only a few thousand receive job-specific training. See Firestone V, supra note 126, at
B1.
131. See Firestone II, supra note 93, at B3.
132. See id.
133. These changes include a new screening program and finger-imaging for
participants.
134. See Firestone II, supra note 93, at B3.
135. See id.
136. See Sharpe, supra note 86, at Al.
137. See Jason DeParle, A Sharp Decrease in Welfare Cases is Gathering Speed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at Al.
138. See id.
139. See Johnson I, supra note 5, at B6.
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to bargain collectively with their employers regarding their hours,
wages, and terms and conditions of employment, as well as the pro-
tection of federal minimum wage law or, in some municipalities,
local "living wage" initiatives. The 1996 welfare legislation is es-
sentially silent on many of these critical issues and, while litigation
is certain to quickly proliferate, at present there is relatively little
pertinent case law to serve as a benchmark.
1. Johns v. Stewart
Prior to the passage of the 1996 federal law, the Tenth Circuit
applied the economic realities test to determine if workfare partici-
pants were "employees" within the broad statutory meaning of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. In Johns v. Stewart,140 the plaintiffs, wel-
fare recipients, claimed they were unlawfully compensated below
the minimum wage for the hours they participated in the Financial
Assistance Emergency Work Program ("EWP") and General
Assistance/Work Experience and Training Program. ("GA-
WEAT").' 4' They contended they were "employees" of the Utah
Department of Human Services and, thus, entitled to receive the
minimum wage pursuant to section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938142 ("FLSA"). 143
In its determination, the court of appeals looked at the circum-
stances of the activity as a whole, including the economic realities
of the relationship between the two parties. The court held that
the work component of GA-WEAT and EWP was just one re-
quirement of the programs.144 To participate, recipients must meet
a needs test, be at least marginally employable, have no dependent
children, and agree to participate in education, training, skills de-
velopment, and job search activities. 145 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the overall relationship between the plaintiffs and
defendants was based on assistance, not "employment."'1 46 Unlike
employers, workfare participants apply for public assistance, not
for a state job; they do not receive checks from the state payroll;
140. 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 1551.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1938). Under the FLSA, an "employee" is "any individual
employed by an employer."
143. 57 F.3d at 1551.
144. Id. at 1558.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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and taxes are not withheld from their checks.147 By focusing on
the overall relationship between the parties, the court thus found
that workfare participants were not "employees" under the FLSA.
2. Brukhman v. Giuliani
In a potentially landmark decision, the New York Supreme
Court in Brukhman v. Giuliani148 held that workfare recipients
must recieve a "living wage '149 where work performed was
equivalent to that done by City employees. 150
In April 1996, the New York City Department of Social Services
("City DSS") revised its Work Experience Program ("WEP") to
include recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC"), along with recipients of Home Relief ("HR"), who
were already being assigned to work. 151 AFDC recipients are lim-
ited to working twenty hours per week,152 since the City must also
provide costly child care. Case workers calculate the number of
hours a WEP participant must work on a biweekly basis by divid-
ing the amount of the public assistance grant 153 by the federal mini-
mum wage, regardless of the particular WEP assignment. On
February 12, 1997, the New York State Department of Social Serv-
ices ("State DSS") issued a memo requiring local agencies to deter-
mine rates of pay in accordance with SSL section 336-c, although
the Department of Labor does not have information which would
assist in this determination. Workfare participants sought a prelim-
inary injunction to stay the enforcement of their WEP obligations
until they could be compensated according to the, rate of pay of
persons employed in similar occupations.
The City argued that workfare participants could not be consid-
ered "employees" or compared with City employees for wage cal-
culations. The City emphasized a number of differences between
City employees and workfare participants, including the limited va-
riety of tools workfare recipients may use, 54 and prohibitions on
147. Id. at 1577. The court cited to Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324,
1328 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that resident-hall assistants ("RAs") are not employees
under the FLSA although the RA's services benefited Regis, the student went to Re-
gis for an education rather than to take this job, and the RA program is only one
component of the entire educational relationship).
148. 662 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
149. For a discussion of living wage initiatives, see infra Part III.B.
150. Brukhman, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
151. Id. at 916.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 916. The public assistance grant includes food stamps for HR recipients.
154. Id. at 918.
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placing collected trash into trucks.'55 Furthermore, the City
claimed a difference existed between the "simple" filing required
of a workfare participant and the "complex" filing a City clerk per-
forms.156 The City also attempted to distinguish answering "rou-
tine" calls from answering "complex" calls.' 57 The court found
these differences to be negligible and inconsistent with the goal of
WEP, which is to enable participants to achieve independence
through employment. Therefore, the court held that many jobs
performed by the workfare participants were similar to the job du-
ties of City employees. 158
The court focused on SSL section 336-c, enacted in 1990. SSL
section 336-c provides that before an AFDC recipient may be as-
signed to WEP, the local social service agency calculates the
number of hours the recipient must work by dividing the welfare
benefits by the state minimum wage, federal minimum wage, or
"the rate of pay for persons employed in the same or similar occu-
pations by the same employer at the same or equivalent site."'1 59
As to the HR recipients, the court held that Article 1, section 17 of
the New York State Constitution provided that laborers engaged: in
"public work" would not be paid less than the prevailing wages for
such work.16  SSL section 164 provides that the City DSS must
provide "public work projects" for those who receive HR.161 The
New York City regulations clearly identify the work performed by
HR recipients as public work. Therefore, HR compensation must
be measured according to those doing comparable work. 16 1
The issue became whether there was comparable work to make
the proper computation. If no comparable work exists, or the state
or federal minimum wage is higher, the employer must calculate
the rate of pay based on the minimum wage. Thus, where the jobs
155. Id. at 916.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 336-c (2)(b) (McKinney 1990).
160. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17. This section provides:
"No laborer .... in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor engaged in
the performance of any public work, shall. . . , be paid less than the rate of
wages prevailing in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the
state where such public work is to be situated, erected or used."
Id.
161. N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 164 (McKinney 1990).
162. Brukhman, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The City DSS determines whether the gen-
eral nature of the position assigned is similar to an existing job. This does not mean
that social services must determine that a workfare participant will be engaged in
every function of a particular job title.
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of workfare recipients are substantially similar to workers in com-
parable positions and employed by the same employer, the rate of
pay must be proportional.
C. Workfare Recipients versus Public Sector Employees
The inexorable labor relations impact of the new welfare reform
upon current public sector employees and their unions will be
profound. Since welfare recipients are legally considered welfare
program participants, not public sector employees, they are not
protected by the federal labor laws. 63 Moreover, they are ex-
pressly forbidden to unionize by the specific terms of the federal
welfare legislation.164 Recipients will lose their welfare benefits if
they attempt a work slowdown or any other collective action.165 In
fact, they can lose their welfare benefits for the slightest infraction
of the rules. 66
Although workfare may originally have been conceived to sup-
plement the public sector work force, it has instead begun to sup-
plant it. 167 Workfare has similarly altered the infrastructure of low
wage employment by causing job displacement among the working
poor.1 68 Those employed in the public sector have found their jobs
most at risk. Public sector employment is theoretically protected
163. See supra Part II.B. Federal protections not applicable to welfare workers in-
clude federal wage and hour, unemployment compensation, or workplace safety and
health laws.
164. See Joe Sexton, Discontented Workfare Laborers Murmur 'Union,' N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at B1. Four thousand of 35,000 workfare workers in New York
City have signed authorization cards with the Association of Community Organiza-
tions for Reform Now (ACORN), with 15,000 to 20,000 more projected. See id.;
David Gonzalez, Acorn Yearns to Grow Tall, Via Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997,
at B1. Many workfare recipients believe that their working situation would improve
if they could organize. See Julia Campbell, Anger in Workfare Ranks, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1997, at sec. 13, p. 10 . Among their complaints are the lack of proper equip-
ment to perform their duties, the frequent threats by supervisors of losing their bene-
fits, and the lack of training that will lead to better jobs. See id. ACORN, a nonprofit
community activist group, is leading the initiative to coordinate programs for
workfare recipients to bargain with employers. See id. ACORN has already gathered
11,000 signatures of workfare recipients, purportedly authorizing ACORN to speak
on their behalf. See id. In addition, the AFL-CIO may begin to ally with the commu-
nity organizers to help secure welfare workers more permanent governmental jobs,
while also protecting the current employment opportunities of unionized municipal
employees. See Leslie Kaufman, Welfare's Labor Pains, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1997, at
39.
165. See Firestone I, supra note 62, at Al.
166. See id.
167. See Poch, supra note 85, at 43 (1997).
168. For example, a welfare recipient was recruited to work at a hospital in New
Jersey without pay, while a full time salaried employee for 27 years was limited to
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by legislation, but government officials continue to seek reductions
in labor costs. 169 President Clinton has issued a directive for the
government to reduce welfare rolls by hiring an additional 10,000
welfare recipients as federal employees, despite federal govern-
ment downsizing by 300,000 employees since 1993.170
These costs and mandates will spur local governments to reduce
the number of people on welfare while concomitantly pressuring
local governments to "reinvest" and "downsize, '"171 replacing full
time, permanent employees with lower labor cost welfare work-
ers.172 In many cases, the terminated workers are the new welfare
laborers. 73
part-time work at half the pay. See Louis Uchitelle, Welfare Recipients Taking Jobs
Often Held by the Working Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
169. There are a series of cases already filed in New York by unions seeking protec-
tion against displacement challenging the expansion of Workfare into areas of work
exclusively and traditionally performed by union employees. See Poch, supra note 85,
at 44-46; see also AFSCME N.Y. Council 66 v. County of Niagara, 98 A.D.2d 970, 470
N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1983); Matter of Ballentine v. Sugarman, 74 Misc. 2d 278, 344
N.Y.S.2d 39, affd sub nom, Gotbaum v. Lindsay, 43 A.D.2d 815, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1000,
appeal dismissed, 34 N.Y.2d 667, 311 N.E.2d 656, 355 N.Y.S.2d 1085 (1973); Matter of
Danker v. Department of Health of City of New York, 266 N.Y. 365, 194 N.E. 857
(1935); AFSCME N.Y. Council 66 v. City of Lackawanna, 476 N.Y.S.2d 666 (4th
Dep't 1984).
170. See Irvin Molotsky, President Says the Government Will Hire 10,000 Off Wel-
fare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A26. President Clinton stated that the welfare rolls
had been reduced by 20%, or 2.8 million people, during his first term. See id. He
expects similar results in his second term by creating entry-level jobs in the Com-
merce Department, the Defense Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs, and
the Social Security Administration. See id. A study from the Council of Economic
Advisors suggested that more than 40% of the drop in welfare was attributable to the
improvement in the economy, while about 30% was due to specific welfare reform
efforts. See id.
171. See DAVID OSBORNE, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1991).
172. New Orleans, for example, has replaced its full-time sanitation workers with
ad hoc day laborers. See Thomas, supra note 7, at Al.
173. Id. at Al. For example:
That contract workers are widely used is well known ... as many as one-fifth
of them, probably more than a million.., have returned to their old compa-
nies, many after having been pushed off payrolls or lured off with lucrative
buyouts.... The Labor Department recently produced the first major statis-
tical evidence of people cycling back to their old employers as contract
workers. Its report found that among five million contingent workers, 17%
of a representative sample surveyed in 1995 said they had had a "previous
different relationship" with the companies that now, in effect, rent them...
Similarly, the American Management Association, in a survey of 720 compa-
nies that recently shed workers, found that 30% had brought back down-
sized employees, on contract or as rehired employees.
Louis Uchitelle, More Downsized Workers Are Returning As Rentals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1996, at Al.
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By reducing the number of people on welfare, enrollment in
workfare projects will decrease, which provides a strong incentive
for local governments to make it harder for people to stay on wel-
fare. The"1996 Act poses two options for the states: reduce
caseloads by making eligibility more difficult or place recipients in
jobs. Nonetheless, reducing certain programs, discarding the 60-
year old entitlement that required the federal government to share
the cost of programs, implementing a fixed annual grant that does
not vary with the size of the poverty rolls, and limiting the duration
of aid to five years, does not create needed jobs.1 74 Instead, the
current welfare reforms are eerily similar to the poor laws of colo-
nial times which gave the poor the "choice" of working or
starving. 75
Welfare programs are placed in the hands of local governments;
they are no longer national entitlements. 76 The new bill caps an-
nual federal aid at $16.4 billion nationwide without new funding for
jobs and training. 77 One study showed that the bill would move
2.6 million people into poverty and 11 million families would lose
income.' 1 New York State, for example, has already imposed a
rigorous screening process for Home Relief. 179 Many believe that,
174. See Jason DeParle, Cutting Welfare Rolls But Raising Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1997, at Al. For example, Milwaukee has adopted the strict rules envisioned
by the federal welfare law by attempting to divert new applicants from the rolls, re-
quiring recipients to work 35 hours a week for their benefits, and cutting welfare
checks by $4.25 for every hour of work missed. See id. This system has resulted in
caseloads shrinking by 25% last year, and each month 1,800 additional people leave
the rolls. See id. About 12,000 of the city's 26,000 welfare families are now enrolled
in the work program. See id.
175. See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial
America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 81 (1996).
176. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(b), 110 Stat. 2105; see also Quigley, supra note 175, at
82-3. The new laws provide block grants to the states. Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 403, 110 Stat.
2105. States are required to spend set amounts in order to keep this aid. Id.
§ 403(a)(1). Work requirements are to be strictly enforced at the expense of having
benefits cut. Id. § 407(e)(1). States are free to set eligibility and benefit levels and
there is no minimum amount of benefits to be granted. Id. § 407. States may even
choose whether to offer cash or other types of assistance. Id. § 404.
177. See Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done; Welfare Reform,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 49. Federal funding will stay the same for six
years and there will be no adjustments for inflation or population growth. See id. at
50. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the bill falls $12 billion short of
providing enough funding for six years to meet work requirements. See id.
178. See id. at 46.
179. See Raymond Hernandez, Rules on Welfare for New York Miss Goals for
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al.
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in the absence of federal regulations, the obstacles to staying on
welfare will only increase. 8 °
New York state law forbids the replacement of regular employ-
ees with workfare participants,' 8 ' but much of the work previously
performed by the 20,000 City employees who left their jobs in the
past two years is now being done by the 35,000 workfare recipients
in the City's Work Experience Program'8 2 ("WEP"). Leaders of
the New York City Transit Workers' Union agreed to let thousands
of welfare recipients clean subways and buses in return for a guar-
antee that no union workers would be laid off until 1999.183 Under
the plan, the Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA") would elim-
inate about five hundred jobs through attrition, and use thousands
of welfare recipients as subway cleaners under the workfare pro-
gram.' 84 When vacancies occur beyond the initial five hundred
eliminated jobs, some welfare recipients will be hired full-time. 185
While an obvious practical result will be cleaner trains, buses, and
stations, the main reason for the Union's support is the promise,
for a few more years, of job security for its current membership. 186
Stanley Hill, the Executive Director of DC 37, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, New York City's largest municipal union comprised of more
than 120,000 civilian members, wants Mayor Giuliani to freeze the
City's current 35,000 person workfare force until extensive negotia-
tions clarify matters. 187 Hill, who originally spoke out in favor of
the workfare plan, was severely criticized by other labor leaders. 188
The law requires 200,000 welfare recipients in New York City to be
placed into workfare jobs by the year 2002.189 Under federal law,
states must place a quarter of their welfare recipients into jobs by
the end of 1997, and half by 2002.190 Thus, New York City must
expand its workfare force to 60,000 by 1998.191 Union leaders con-
180. See Edelman, supra note 177, at 58.
181. See Russ Buettner, MTA Workfare Deal Illegal, Critics Say, DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 22, 1996, at 42.
182. See id.
183. See Richard Perez-Pena, Transit Union Agrees to Allow Workfare Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Steven Greenhouse, New York Union Leader Urges Halt to Broadening
Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Greenhouse IV].
188. See id.
189. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 407, 110 Stat. 2105.
190. Id.
191. See Greenhouse IV, supra note 187, at Al.
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tend that workfare participants are taking jobs previously held by
union members, but receive only a small fraction of the former
City workers' pay and no employment benefits such as sick leave
and vacation pay.192 Stanley Hill wants the City to hire union
workers to fill vacancies in the municipal hospitals and to provide
permanent jobs for workfare participants in the Parks Depart-
ment.1 93 He does not want workfare to be used simply to obtain
concessions from the City's labor unions.1 94
On September 27, 1996, Hill agreed to drop his demand that the
City stop expanding its workfare program in exchange for a pledge
by Mayor Giuliani to consider hiring an unspecified number of
welfare workers as City employees. 95 The agreement gives the
Mayor the ability to expand the workfare force beyond its 35,000
current participants. 96 The Mayor believes that the program will
grow by 4,000-5,000 people per month, and likely will exceed
100,000 in a few years.197
In addition, the New York City Transit Workers Union narrowly
approved a labor contract that permits City welfare recipients to
clean subways and buses. 198 The Union conceded after the City
repeatedly warned that failure to approve the labor contract could
lead to layoffs of thousands of Union members. 99 As many as 500
of the 2,800 unionized transit jobs will be eliminated through attri-
tion, and the work thereafter will be performed by those in the
workfare program.2° The new labor contract was approved by a
vote of 8,183 to 7,410.201 Dissident subway workers within the
Union continue to protest, but the Union dominated by bus drivers
ignores their cries.2 °2 Significantly, it is within the subway system
that most of the workfare workers likely will be employed.20 3
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See David Firestone, Labor Leader Drops Demand on Workfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1996, at A25 [hereinafter Firestone VI]; Greenhouse IV, supra note 187, at
Al.
196. See Firestone VI, supra note 195, at A25.
197. See Greenhouse IV, supra note 187, at Al.
198. See Richard Perez-Pena, Transit Pact is Approved by Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1996, at B1.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. The subway workers rejected the labor contract, 58% to 42%, while
75% of bus drivers voted to approve the contract. See id.
203. See id.
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Although labor union leaders believe it is important that
workfare workers find permanent employment, many union lead-
ers believe that workfare is growing too fast, and taking jobs away
from union workers. 20  Despite the "no-layoff" clause in union
contracts with New York City, there is a gnawing fear that many
current full-time employees will be, over time, permanently dis-
placed en masse by workfare workers.
I. The Role of Catholic Social Teaching on the Rights of
Workers
The Catholic Church's eloquent and long-standing social teach-
ing on the rights of all workers continues to be a beacon of juris-
prudential and practical hope, transcending the often crabbed and
hostile policies of particular nation-states toward the rights of
workers.2 o5
A. The Right to Unionize
The right to unionize is a fundamental human and civil right.20 6
In the international legal regime, major Conventions numbers 87
and 98 of the International Labor Organization protect, workers'
rights to associate freely, to organize, and to bargain collectively
with their employers.20 7 Unfortunately, the United States is not a
signatory to either of these Conventions.2 °8 Moreover, the statu-
tory labor relation law regime in the United States, exemplified by
Section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act 20 9 ("NLRA") and
reinforced by case law,210 removes supervisors, managers, domestic
workers, and agricultural workers from the protections of the
204. See Greenhouse IV, supra note 187, at Al.
205. See generally David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transforma-
tion of Work, 45 WASH.& LEE L. REV. 119 (1988); David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's
Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57 (1996); David L.
Gregory, The Right to Unionize As A Fundamental Human And Civil Right, 9 Miss.
C.L. REV. 135 (1988); David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v.
Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic Labor Theory 41 LAB. L.J. 55
(1990).
206. See David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and
Civil Right, 9 Miss. C.L. REV. 135, 136 (1988).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1993).
210. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (finding that university
faculty are supervisors or managers, not "employees" protected by the NLRA);
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 271 (1974) (finding that managers are not
"employees" protected by the NLRA).
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NLRA.211 Since these workers are not considered "employees"
within the meaning of the Act, they are beyond the bounds of its
direct protections.
Because the tensions regarding the welfare workforce are perva-
sively suffused with morals and ethics, as well as practical economic
issues, Catholic social teaching on the rights of workers to unionize
can be a powerful rhetorical instrument to change both legislation
and broader public policy to regard the welfare workforce as "em-
ployees" with the fundamental human and civil rights to unionize.
The Catholic social teaching does not artificially draw unduly nar-
row distinctions among the classes of workers who should be eligi-
ble to unionize. Pope Leo XIII developed this thinking in his
classic Papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum (on the Condition of La-
bor)' in 1891. Pope Leo XIII wrote:
In the first place-employers and workmen may themselves ef-
fect much in the matter of which We treat, by means of those
institutions and organizations which afford opportune .assistance
to those in need, and which draw the two orders more closely
together.... The most important of all are Workmen's Associa-
tions; for these virtually include all the rest. History attests what
excellent results were effected by the Artificer's Guilds of a for-
mer day. They were the means not only of many advantages to
the workmen, but in no small degree of the advancement of art,
as numerous monuments remain to prove. Such associations
should be adapted to the requirements of the age in which we
live-an age of greater instruction, of different customs, and of
more numerous requirements in daily life. It is gratifying to
know that there are actually in existence not a few Societies of
this nature, consisting of workmen alone, or of workmen and
employers together; but it were greatly to be desired that they
should multiply and become more effective.21
The Catholic Church has consistently subscribed to and enhanced
these principles supporting workers' rights.213 Within the United
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1993).
212. POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (ON THE CONDITION OF LABOR) 36
(1891).
213. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA (MOTHER AND TEACHER:
CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS) 31-33 (1961); POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM
EXERCENS (ON HUMAN WORK) 20 (1981); POPE PAUL VI, OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS
(A CALL TO ACTION) 14 (1971); POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (AFTER
FORTY YEARS) 31-33 (1931); SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES (PAS-
TORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CH4URCH IN THE MODERN WORLD) 68 (1965).
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States, these universal principles of social justice have been reiter-
ated by the United States Bishops.214
B. The Renaissance of the "Living Wage" Initiative
In 1992, eighteen percent of Americans with full-time jobs nev-
ertheless had annual earnings of less than $13,091, while the official
definition of poverty for a family of four was $14,428.15 In 1979,
only twelve percent of all full-time workers earned comparably low
wages.216 Moreover, the minimum wage of 1968, adjusted for infla-
tion, would be $7.20 today.217 The number of people not earning a
living wage is increasing dramatically, and the minimum wage has
fallen significantly below the poverty line. 18
'Current federal law is silent as to whether the minimum wage is
available for welfare recipients on workfare.219 This has raised a
debate as to whether welfare recipients should receive the federal
minimum wage or a living wage.22 ° The White House has recom-
214. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops stated:
The Church fully supports the right of workers to form unions or other as-
sociations to secure their rights to fair wages and working conditions. This is
a specific application of the more general right to associate. In the words of
Pope John Paul II, "The experience of history teaches that organizations of
this type are an indispensable element of social life, especially in modern
industrialized societies." Unions may also legitimately resort to strikes
where this is the only available means to the justice owed to workers. No
one may deny the right to organize without attacking human dignity itself.
Therefore, we firmly oppose organized efforts, such as those regrettably now
seen in this country, to break existing unions and prevent workers from
organizing.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL 104
(1986); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS (ON THE HUNDREDTH AN-
NIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM) 7-8 (1991).
215. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Survey Finds Sharp Rise in Working Poor Salaries:
The Number of Full Time Workers Who Earn Less Than a Living Wage Rose from
12% to 18% in 13 Years, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at 1.
216. See id.
217. See Paul Winslow, Missouri Must Raise the Minimum Wage, ST. Louis DIS-
PATCH, Aug. 21, 1996, at 6B.
218. See William P. Quigley, A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work: Time to Raise
and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 513, 539 (1996).
219. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"-Wrong for Welfare,
Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 29 (1994).
220. Justice Solomon of the New York State Supreme Court ruled that New York
City must base pay on what the City pays a regular worker for similar tasks. See
Steven Greenhouse, Judge Rejects a Formula for Benefits in Workfare, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Greenhouse V]. This will mean the City will have to
reduce the number of hours each welfare recipient has to work in order to avoid
higher costs. One advantage to the workers besides higher wages is that they will be
able to spend more time in education and training programs which will help them to
move off welfare. The City will also benefit from this arrangement because it will be
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mended that workfare recipients be covered by federal minimum
wage law, but Republicans in the House of Representatives have
sponsored legislation to repudiate the Clinton Labor Department's
position.221 The Republicans claim that workfare is not true em-
ployment, but merely an opportunity to learn proper working hab-
its.22 2 They argue that a minimum wage for workfare would make
workfare prohibitively expensive and many states would, thus,
have to reduce programs and risk losing federal aid for noncompli-
ance. 223 Furthermore, a minimum wage standard may reduce in-
centives for participants to leave welfare. In the case of New York
City, this may also result in job displacement for union employees
whose jobs may be performed by welfare workers at a lower cost to
the City.2 24 As a result, some local governments have resolved to
do even more, and require all doing business with the government
to pay their workers a "living wage" well above the federal mini-
mum wage.
1. Catholic Social Teaching and the Living Wage
The "living wage" principle is rooted in Catholic social teaching
regarding the rights of workers. It has been repeatedly elucidated
in papal encyclicals and in bishops' pastoral letters in some of the
most eloquent language ever concentrated on the issues of just
compensation.225 Within the domestic economy, the United States
able to employ more people by spreading the wbrk around. In addition, this decision
pleases union leaders who are afraid that cheap labor will replace them. Id.
221. See Department of Labor Guidance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No..103, at D-24
(May 29, 1997) ("Federal employment laws ... apply to welfare recipients as they
apply to other workers. The new welfare law does not exempt welfare recipients from
these laws."); see also Robert Pear, G.O.P. in House Moves to Bar Minimum Wage for
Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at B16.
222. See Greenhouse V, supra note 220, at B3.
223. See id.
224. See Jason DeParle, White House Calls for Minimum Wage in Workfare Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1997, at Al.
225. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA (CHRISTIANITY AND SO-
CIAL PROGRESS) (1961) ("The remuneration of work is not something that can be left
to laws of the market; nor ought it to be fixed arbitrarily. It must be determined in
accordance with justice and equity; which means that workers must be paid a wage
which allows them to live a truly human life and to fulfill their obligations in a worthy
manner. To raise or to lower wages unduly, with a view to private advantage, and
with no consideration for the common good, is therefore contrary to social justice.");
POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS (ON THE HUNDRETH ANNIVERSARY OF
RERUM NOVARUM) (1991) ("Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not
the only one; other human and moral factors must also be considered which in the
long term are at least equally important for the life of a business."); POPE LEO XIII,
RERUM NOVARUM (ON THE CONDITION OF LABOR) (1891) ("Wages ought not to be
insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved earner. If through necessity or fear
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Bishops apply two universal theories: (1) "the Church fully sup-
ports the right of workers to form unions or other associations to
secure their rights to fair wages and working conditions; ' 226 and (2)
"all people have the right to economic initiative, to productive
work, to just wages and benefits, to decent working conditions as
well as to organize and join unions or other associations. "227
In the early 1900s, Monsignor John Augustine Ryan of the Cath-
olic University of America was the single most prominent living
wage champion in the United States. He believed that wages paid
to the head of the household should be sufficient for every member
of a family to perfect his or her rational nature.228 Such wages
were essential for individual self-development. 229 Ryan's beliefs
were based on his formula for individual rights: "Every individual
has a right to all things that are essential to the reasonable develop-
ment of his personality. 230
Monsignor Ryan bridged Catholic social teaching into the New
Deal legislative reforms and favored the passage of the Fair Labor
of a worse evil the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer contrac-
tor will afford no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice .... Wages must
be sufficient to enable him to maintain himself, his wife, and his children in reason-
able comfort."); POPE PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO (ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PEOPLES) (1967) ("It is unfortunate . . . a system has been constructed which
considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, competition as the supreme
law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute
right that has no limits and carries no corresponding social obligation. This un-
checked liberalism leads to dictatorship rightly denounced by Pius XI as producing
'the international imperialism of money.' One cannot condemn such abuses too
strongly .... "); POPE PAUL VI, OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS (1971) ("Every man has the
right to work, to a chance to develop his qualities and his personality in the exercises
of his profession, to equitable remuneration which will enable him and his family 'to
lead a worthy life on the material, social, cultural and spiritual level,' and to assistance
in the case of need arising from sickness or age."); POPE PIus XI, QUADRAGESIMO
ANNO (1931) ("It violates right order.., whenever capital so employs the working or
wage-earning classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely to its own
arbitrary will and advantage without any regard to the human dignity of the workers,
the social character of economic life, social justice and the common good.... Wealth,
therefore, which is constantly being augmented by social and economic progress, must
be so distributed among the various individuals and classes of society, that the needs
of all of which Leo XIII spoke, be thereby satisfied.").
226. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE. FOR
ALL (1986).
227. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATHOLIC FRAMEWORK
FOR ECONOMIC LIFE (1996).
228. For a thoughtful meditation on, in part, the work of Monsignor Ryan, see
Harlan R. Beckley, Love, Human Dignity, and Justice: Some Legacies from Protestant
and Catholic Ethics, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1053, 1063 (1991).
229. See id. at 1062.
230. Id.
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and Standards Act 23 1 ("FLSA"), establishing the federal minimum
wage. 232 The legislative history of the FLSA indicates that a pri-
mary purpose of the minimum wage law was to provide a living
wage.233 President Roosevelt envisioned that the FLSA would
guarantee a "living wage" and a "decent living" for all Ameri-
cans. 234 Reports to Congress supported the goal of the minimum
wage as a living wage: the minimum wage was to establish a wage
floor adequate to support life with human dignity, and a just wage
in return for a day's work.235
Now, more than sixty years later, the New Deal alliance between
religion and labor shows signs of a resurgence.236 Living wage ini-
tiatives for all workers will be an important part of the alliance's
reform agenda.
231. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1993).
232. See Beckley, supra note 228, at 1064.
233. See Quigley, supra note 175, at 529.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 530.
236. AFL-CIO President John Sweeney asked the Vatican to issue a statement on
workers' rights prior to the opening of the ministerial meeting of the World Trade
Organization. See Sweeny Asks Vatican to Issue Statement Critical of WTO Stance on
Workers' Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 237, at D-7 (Dec. 16, 1996); REGINA
BOTrERIL, THE FAITH & WORK CONGREGATIONAL STUDY GUIDE ON WORKER JUS-
TICE (1996); Steven Greenhouse, Labor and Clergy are Reuniting to Help the Under-
dogs of Society, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at Al (following the New York State
Labor-Religion Coalition, forty clerics formed the National Interfaith Committee for
Worker Justice).
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2. The New York City Living Wage Legislation237
The living wage bill was first introduced in New York City by
Councilmember Sal Albanese in February 1995.38 It was designed
to guarantee a living wage for all City employees, particularly those
who work for contractors doing business with the City.239 About
12,500 workers with City contractors earn less than $6.00 an hour
with no health benefits.240 The bill would raise these workers' sala-
ries to at least $12.10 an hour, which would cover wages and the
cost of benefits. 41 Several months later, Councilmember Kathryn
Freed introduced her version of the living wage bill, which would
guarantee health coverage, but did not mandate a direct dollar
amount wage.242 Freed instead proposed a wage that would enable
workers to live above the poverty level in New York City.243
Neither of these bills gained much support; they were deemed
too expensive. 44 A later draft of the bill, supported by City Coun-
237. A number of other cities have also addressed living wage initiatives. In 1996,
Milwaukee's City Council passed a living wage ordinance to pay employees of city
contractors $6.05 an hour. See Vikki Ortiz & Gail Perry-Daniels, Living Wage Effort
Gets Push at Town Hall Parley Here, CAP. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1A. In April 1997,
the Los Angeles City Council voted to override Mayor Riordan's earlier veto of that
city's living wage ordinance, and now requires those employers who contract with Los
Angeles to pay at least $7.50 an hour to approximately 7,500 workers. In addition, the
affected workers receive medical coverage or an additional $1.25 an hour to enable
the worker to afford minimal medical coverage in the market. See Matthew Miller,
Wages of Politics, NEW REPUBLIC 12, Feb. 10, 1997. In Massachussetts, the state
legislature likewise overrode then-Governor Weld's veto, to require a minimum living
wage of $5.25 per hour, slightly above the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour.
A coalition of community and labor activists in Boston continue to call for a living
wage of at least $7.50 per hour to be paid to the employees of any contractor holding
contracts of $10,000 or more with the city of Boston. See Ted Bunker, Activists Call
for a Living Wage, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 3, 1996, at 20; Jane Slaughter, Working for
a Living Wage, 60 THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1996, at 16. There are also similar
initiatives underway in Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, Denver, and Madison,
Wisconsin. See, e.g., Frank James, Baltimore Tries Out "Living Wage" Requirements-
Goal is to Lift Low-Paid Workers Above Poverty, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1995, at 1;
Jonathan Kerr, Missouri: Minimum Wage, Park Tax Head Ballot Issues, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 13, 1996; Neal Peirce, Minimum Wage Push: Cities, States Not
Waiting for the Feds, 19 NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, June 17, 1996, at 7.
238. See E. Assata Wright, Waging Battle for Decent Pay: Watered Down, The Liv-
ing Wage Bill Will Probably Pass, VILLAGE VOICE, June 18, 1996, at 2-3.
239. See id. at 10. The Federal Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-51,
requires construction contractors to pay their workers prevailing wages which match
union pay levels. See Wright, supra note 238, at 10.
240. See Wright, supra note 238, at 10.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
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cil Speaker Peter Vallone, was much narrower in scope.245 The
"Prevailing Wage Bill," as it was renamed, was limited to four job
categories (security, food service, custodial, and temporary/cleri-
cal) and did not include health benefits.246 Under this bill, workers
in these categories would earn a prevailing wage for their job clas-
sification, as determined by a comptroller-conducted survey of pri-
vate, non-union pay.247 The wage levels would range from a
minimum of $7.25 an hour for unarmed security guards to more
than $12.00 an hour for janitors.248 The bill also exempted the not-
for-profit sector from compliance.249
Living wage proponents in New York assert that the gross in-
come of a full-time minimum wage worker remains significantly
below the $14,783 federal poverty level for a family of four,2 50 as
well as the $19,100 a family of four living in the New York City
area annually requires to live above the poverty line.25' Many
workers also rely on other social services such as Medicaid, rent
subsidies, and food stamps to subsidize their income.252
The Prevailing Wage Bill was vetoed by Mayor Giuliani on Au-
gust 7, 1996 after the City Council initially approved it.253 The
Mayor opposed the bill because it would increase indirect labor
costs substantially and raise formidable obstacles for firms wanting
to do business with the City.254 The City Council, however, passed
the living wage legislation, overriding Mayor Giuliani's veto by a
vote of 42 to 5 on September 11, 1996.255 The Mayor vowed to sue
the City Council to strike down the law.2 56
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. The Bill requires paying unarmed security guards $7.25 an hour, food service
workers $9.00 an hour, temporary workers $11.25 an hour, and janitors $14.00 an
hour. See Mohamad Bazzi, Living Wage Bill Gains in Council, NEWSDAY, June 7,
1996, at A6.
249. See Wright, supra note 238, at 10.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Vivian Toy, Giuliani Vetoes a Bill to Make City Contractors Raise Wages,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at B2.
254. See id.
255. See id. For additional discussion of the living wage initiative, see JOHN SWEE-
NEY, AMERICA NEEDS A RAISE 136 (1996) (presenting an overview of organized la-
bor (AFL-CIO) initiatives for a just, living wage, considerably beyond the current
federal minimum wage). See also G. Pascal Zachary, New York Pay is Expected to
Push Up Pay of Some Private Low-Skilled Workers, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at
All.
256. See Toy, supra note 253 at B2.
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3. The Effect of the Living Wage on Public Sector Employees
In most urban areas, especially among racial minorities, finding
permanent, full-time, meaningful, and fulfilling work is often ex-
tremely difficult.257 Low-skill workers find themselves in jobs with
little opportunity. Statistics show that unemployment is down and
employers are hiring, but many of the new jobs offer minimum
wage and little, or no, benefits2 58 As a result, a great number of
these low-skill, low-wage workers often hold two jobs and are still
living at, or below, the poverty line.25 9
Women and minorities recently have made some strides in
achieving meaningful work in the public sector.26 ° This is due, in
part, to the greater constitutional protections afforded public sector
workers. 261 In addition, a high percentage of the public sector
workforce has turned to union representation as a means of attain-
ing better working conditions and job security.262
Those who have been able to attain a level of dignity and respect
as public sector workers are becoming frustrated as they see their
employment jeopardized by the recent privatization of their once
protected jobs and workfare programs.263 A large segment of the
urban workforce has witnessed its jobs evaporate, lost to workfare
participants with little, or no, employment protections. The poten-
tial reaction to this rapid deterioration could be devastating on the
national level.
One long-term effect of workfare is the deterioration of the qual-
ity of public sector services. Workers with no rights, effectively
making less than minimum wage, will have little recourse. The op-
tion of finding more meaningful employment will be drastically re-
duced by the welfare workers' general inability to look for "real"
jobs, due to the requirement of meeting workfare obligations to
maintain their welfare benefits. Two-thirds of the workers who
have participated in New York's workfare program leave after a
257. See WILSON, supra note 6.
258. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at B14.
259. See id.
260. See James P. Allen, Valley Perspective Ethnic Ties Help Determine Choice of
Job Niches are Natural Result of Social Networks that Inform People of Work in Which
Members of their Group are Hired, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at B7.
261. See Baru Rekha, A Draconian Bill on Drug Testing, DES MOINES REGISTER,
Feb. 28, 1997, at 1.
262. See John Jacobs, Editorial, Labor Movement's Wild Ride Sets Political Stage,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 25, 1997, at B7.
263. See Don Rudd, Editorial, Will Privitization Cause Costs to Soar?, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 1997, at B7.
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few months.2 64 To conclude that these workers have found more
fulfilling employment elsewhere, and that workfare was somehow
the impetus, is naive. While the government argues that the core
benefit to these new laborers lies in the very fact that they are
working,265 these workers are actually forced into dead-end jobs
which pay less than the minimum wage. Workers stripped of tights
and protections find little fulfillment,- and even less incentive to
perform well. The government will permanently hire a small
number of the workfare participants to give some hope of opportu-
nity and incentive for good service.266 This, however, will simply
result in a bitterly divided workforce of "haves" and "have nots."
The downward pressures workfare has asserted on the wages and
employment security of the current public sector workforce are
enormous. They will be only partially offset by the implementation
of living wage initiatives in a few localities. Critics argue that the
living wage initiatives will have: the pernicious effect of raising un-
employment in those areas.267 As a practical matter, local govern-
ments inexorably will reduce the size of their full time public sector
workforces through attrition and layoffs to the smallest possible
core full-time workforce. The work will be performed, in many
cases, by former employees, now reduced to the workfare army by
the loss of their previous government employment. The marginally
upward, indirect wage pressures of living wage legislation spon-
sored by a few local governments will not be nearly enough to ef-
fectively stem this trend.
While unions and welfare agencies are lobbying for legislation to
require workfare participants be paid the same wages and benefits,
and afforded the same protections as other employees doing the
same work,268 it would be grossly unrealistic to believe that such
legislation will be broadly enacted. Over time, the unionized pub-
lic sector will lose its bargaining power as segments of the union-
ized workfare are gradually transformed into the "regular"
workforce. Whether "one big union" of welfare workers and cur-
rent public sector full-time employees can ultimately emerge is a
necessary, but dubious, proposition at best.
264. See Alvarez, supra note 64, at sec. 1, p.5 1.
265. See Firestone II, supra note 93, at B3.
266. See Alvarez, supra note 64, at sec. 1, p.51.
267. See Toy, supra note 253, at B2.
268. See Steven Greenhouse, Wages of Workfare: Labor Rewriting Rules in Or-
ganizing Those who Work for their Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1997, at B3; Steven
Greenhouse, Union Seeks to Enlist 35,000 in New York City's Workfare Program, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1997, at sec. 1, p.2 3.
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Conclusion
Over time, social and economic initiatives may have some posi-
tive influences and ease the plight of the most exploited welfare
workers. Enlightened individual firms may also take unilateral
ameliorating action. The egregious exploitation of poor workers
will nonetheless continue to be a virtually intractable problem,
even if the welfare workers successfully unionize and recieve at
least minimum wages. Mobilizing the media to raise the public
consciousness will be indispensable in the inception of any viable,
broad-based reform campaign.
The new welfare workforce may well auger the restoration of the
poorhouse and, quite literally, the Dickensian workhouse. If the
welfare workforce remains legally and practically unorganized, and
isolated from any social solidarity with the broader labor and civic
communities, the welfare workers will be cruelly exploited and
even further alienated. Concomitantly, the public and private sec-
tor workers not in solidarity with the welfare workforce will see
their wages and conditions of employment steadily erode as em-
ployers utilize the "free" welfare workforce. Soon enough, signifi-
cant portions of the low-wage, low-skill public and private sector
workforces will be perniciously trapped in the twenty-first century
workplace equivalent of the "dark Satanic mill,' 2 69 which exempli-
fied the worst labor exploitation of the eighteenth century's early
industrial revolution.
Welfare workers can, however, be socially and politically organ-
ized and integrated into the broader labor and civic communities.
This process can begin to occur through statutory labor and em-
ployment law provisions. For example, welfare workers can be
considered "employees" protected by federal minimum wage or,
preferably, by local and state "living wage" laws. If eligibile to
unionize, welfare workers will be absorbed gradually into both
public and private sector employment. Thus, rather than increas-
ing polarizations between welfare workers and the low-wage, low-
skill public and private sector workers who are most threatened
with job displacement, these tensions can be ameliorated, if not
entirely harmonized, by treating welfare workers as employees.
That the current Republican Congressional leadership will sup-
port the necessary amendments to extant federal labor, employ-
ment, and welfare law is, admittedly, highly unlikely. Indeed,
269. William Blake, And Did Those Feet in Ancient Time in WILLIAM BLAKE,
MITON (1804).
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Congress recently attempted to repudiate the Clinton Labor De-
partment's position that welfare workers are entitled to the protec-
tions of the federal minimum wage law.27° Therefore, in light of
Republican Congressional hostility or, at best, indifference to ex-
tending statutory protections of federal labor and employment law
to welfare workers, it is imperative that municipal and state gov-
ernments expeditiously extend statutory protections at the local
and state levels.
The fundamental policy and practical tensions have been very
starkly drawn by the 1996 welfare workfare legislation. Whether
these tensions can or will be effectively ameliorated has devolved
to the welfare workers, to organized labor 271-for whom the wel-
fare workers should be regarded as posing a wonderful opportunity
for the reinvigoration of organized labor-and to local and state
elected officials. New York City is at the epicenter of the nation's
dangerous repudiation of the New Deal's social safety net. If this
experiment fails, as it seems destined to over the course of the next
recession, the nation's policy choices will be even more starkly
posed.
270. See Christopher Georges, GOP Drive to Deny Workfare Benefits Sputters in
States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1997, at A24; D.O.L. Guidance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 103, at E-3 (May 29, 1997).
271. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), Pub. L. No. 93-
203 (1973), included workers in the same bargaining units as non-CETA employees.
See Mon Valley United Health Services, 238 NLRB 916 (1978); Evergreen Legal Serv-
ices, 246 NLRB 964 (1979).
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